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This thesis studies the U.S. maritime labor force as it
affects the manning of the Ready Reserve Force (RRF). The
focus is on the reasons for the periodic variations in the
labor supply within the U.S. maritime industry. The amount
of labor that will be needed to man a fully-activated RRF is
compared with the amount of labor predicted to be available
to the RRF and the commercial world. The RRF will require
about 16 percent of the predicted available labor force.
Shortages are bound to occur, especially in light of past
history. Recommendations to minimize the amount of shortages
include: instituting better union personnel management
practices; assignment of personnel on a nationwide rather
than local basis, and pooling of union resources to meet
emergencies. It is also recommended that DOD develop its own
backup source of officers to man RRF ships through an
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An important part of the strategic sealift inventory is
the Ready Reserve Force ( RRF ) . During emergency situations
there are three sources of defense surge shipping: Military
Sealift Command ( MSC ) vessels? the voluntary charter of U.S.
flag commercial vessels, and the RRF. It is anticipated that
there will be a total of 116 ships in the RRF by 1991. These
ships will require crews of about 40 people each, utilizing
a total of approximately 5000 seamen. These ships a.re
maintained in five-, ten-, and twenty—day states of readiness
to provide required sealift in emergency situations. The RRF
ships will be manned by merchant seamen.
B. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The U.S. maritime industry has been experiencing a steady
decline since World War II. The loss of U.S. flag ships and
fewer billets on what new U.S. vessels are put into service
have provided consistently less opportunity for employment of
merchant seamen. Most of the industry labor force is aging,
and the jobs are not available to bring younger people into
the industry CRef. lip. 9D . In 1984, there were only 34,000
U.S. merchant seamen making a living at sea. This number is
expected to decline by about 3000 people over the next six
years.
The numbers of people that are required to man the RRF
ships is rising as the number of people available to man them
is declining. RRF ships do not provided a source of steady
employment to the maritime industry because they are manned
only when they are activated. Personnel to operate the ships
must come from an industry whose workforce is shrinking.
The seamen who will man the RRF ships are obtained
through U.S. steamship agents who have signed General Agency
Agreements ( GAA ) with the U.S. government. The agents are
responsible for manning* provisioning, repairing and general
operating of the ship(s) they have under contract. Presently,
there are no requirements for the agents to place priority on
the manning of the GAA vessels for which they are
responsible. Nor is there any requirement that the men they
provide be familiar with the operation of a particular RRF
vessel or its gear.
The decrease in the numbers of skilled mariners in the
industry raises the possibility that there may not be enough
seamen available to man the RRF ships when they are required
in an emergency situation. The issue of adequate manning for
RRF ships is the central focus of this study.
C. METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY
The maritime labor force is unique in that employment
only occurs under Ship's Articles (Articles). Data gathering
to determine the number of workers in the labor pool is done
by taking an inventory of the workforce under Articles.
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Copies of all Articles are maintained by the U.S. Coast
Guard. Data are extracted from the Articles by the Maritime
Administration to be used for workforce size estimates. This
method of accounting for workers makes attrition and entry
data impossible to ascertain.
In an effort to obtain more accurate data concerning
entry and exit to the industry, as well as ar\ actual count of
seafarers available* letters were sent to the unions who have
contracts with the general agents for the RRF ships. These
letters requested information on union membership—size,
entry and exit data, training for members, average age of
members, and future changes anticipated. Only one-third of
those letters were answered. This lack of information led to
the reliance on the data used by MARAD which essentially
represents a "best guess" of the future workforce supply for
the industry.
The union letters, as well as letters sent to the
steamship agents responsible for the RRF ships, requested
information concerning procedures that are established for
the manning of the RRF ships.
In order to gain some feel for the manning problems
encountered during Vietnam, the most recent use of GAA
vessels, the letters also requested information on problems
that may have been encountered manning GAA ships during the
Vietnam conflict. The answers received to these questions
appeared to be contradictory to the government statistics
compiled for that time period. Copies of the letters
requesting the information and the responses received are
provided in Appendices A and B.
Telephone interviews were conducted with personnel in the
Maritime Labor and Training Office of the Maritime
Administration, the Strategic Sealift Division ( 0P-<=+2 ) of the
Chief of Naval Operations, the Operations Research Division
(C-A2) of the Supreme Allied Command, Atlantic, the
Merchant Marine Reserve Program Office of the Chief of
Naval Reserves, and the Harry Lundeberg School of Seamanship.
Archive research provided little data on the subject of
the RRF but a great deal on the job shortages and the
resulting decline in manpower in the maritime industry.
D. LIMITATIONS
The nature of the data collection techniques for this
industry and the unwillingness, or inability, of the unions
to fill the information gaps with data that only they
possess, severely limited the analytical capabilities of this
study. The size of the maritime manpower pool during
peacetime has never been a major issue before and the methods
for capturing the actual size of the manpower pool and its
attrition and entry data have not been developed. Data
received from different sources concerning the same topic are
often contradictory. Because of the methods used for
manpower assignment by the unions it is doubtful that even
they are capable of providing these data at the present time.
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E. CONTENTS
The manning problems that must be faced by the RRF are a
result of the history of the maritime industry. Government
involvement as well as the actions of those in the maritime
industry were all contributors to today's U.S. maritime
situation. Chapter II provides a brief overview of that
history. Chapter III looks at the maritime labor force of
today: who controls it, what laws govern it, training
opportunities, and how all these factors combine to provide
the labor force that will be available for the RRF. Chapter
IV discusses the RRF, including its manpower needs and its
reasons for existence. Chapter V provides an analysis of the
alternatives available to provide adequate manning for the
RRF. Chapter VI presents the conclusions of the study and
recommendations on how to best approach solving the RRF
manning problems.
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II . A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE U.S. MERCHANT MARINE
A. INTRODUCTION
The RRF will be manned by merchant mariners. The
availability of these merchant seamen determines whether or
not the RRF will accomplish its mission. The labor supply of
the industry is governed by the number of ships available to
provide jobs. Unfortunately, the maritime labor supply has
been in an almost constant state of decline since just before
the Civil War. Today's U.S. maritime industry and the status
of its labor force are the results of a long history of
government action followed by government neglect. It is not
possible to fully understand why labor might be in short
supply to man RRF ships without a background in what events
led the U.S. maritime industry to its present status.
B. THE FIRST GROWTH PERIOD
Abundant, easily accessible timber along the
eastern seaboard made shipbuilding a natural industry for the
American colonists. Shipyards were easily established as
little capital investment was required. Ships built in the
colonies were so inexpensive, compared to those built in
England, that by the time of the American Revolution,
one-third of all British flag shipping was provided by
American shipyards CRef. 2:p. 173.
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The American colonies had no manufacturing capabilities
and British law did not allow any to be imported to the
country. Maritime activities were considered an acceptable
source of income for the colonists because the income
provided by shipping was spent for British manufactured
goods, and having British-American ships at sea provided a
training ground for seamen. These seamen would be useful for
British shipping and naval needs.
After the Revolutionary War, American leaders found
themselves with a strong merchant fleet but few trade routes.
The loss of British citizenship had deprived them of entry
rights to the lucrative British trade routes previously
enjoyed. To deal with this problem, a provision was included
in the U.S. Constitution that international and interstate
trade would be regulated by the national government.
One of the initial steps taken by the first Congress to
support this responsibility was the passage of the Tariff Act
of 1789. This bill provided import tax incentives for all
shippers to ship their goods on American vessels. It also
encouraged the ownership of U.S. -built vessels by charging
less in U.S. port entry fees to U.S. -built and registered
ships. This fee differentiation tended to encourage
participation of only U.S . -reg istered ships in the U.S.
coastal trade.
In 1817, Congress formally closed U.S. coastal trading to
foreign vessels. By 1795, 9S percent of American imports and
13
36 percent of American exports were transported on American
vessels CRef. 3:p. 73.
Between 1792 and 1815, Europe was involved in nearly
constant warfare. This warfare provided enormous trading
opportunities for American businessmen. Neutral American
vessels could enter the ports of all warring countries. While
involved in war, the merchant fleets of the belligerent
countries were mostly used for other than peacetime
commercial pursuits. The related abandonment of many of the
peacetime trading routes provided American traders with the
opportunity to enter those routes as well as develop new
routes with virtually no competition.
In 1S07, President Thomas Jefferson closed American ports
to foreign traders in an effort to force political and
economic concessions from the Europeans. His actions had
little effect on the European community and were later
dropped. Yet, for America the closing of U.S. ports played a
major role in influencing domestic attitudes and policies for
some time thereafter. Jefferson's foreign trade embargo cost
the maritime industry an estimated 55,000 seagoing jobs and
100,000 jobs in related industries CRef.2:p. 33]. At the
same time, approximately $5 million flowed from commerce to
industrialization CRef. 2:p. 34 3. Land-based industry grew in
economic and political power while drawing investment dollars
and workers away from the more hazardous and uncertain
maritime industry. Government policies began to change from
1<+
those encouraging free-trade to protectionism and by the
outbreak of the Civil War » the American government no longer
maintained a maritime orientation. The number of ships began
to decline and with them the jobs available to a labor force
which had already begun to be drawn to the safer, easier jobs
ashore.
C. THE FIRST DECLINE
The Civil War contributed further to the labor force
decline. During the Civil War, America lost 24- percent of
its carrying trade to other flags CRef. 2:p. 663. The
reasons for this loss are varied and can be equally
attributed to both sides in the conflict. Confederate
raiders destroyed many of the merchant ships that were flying
the Union flag. The Union navy purchased hundreds of sailing
and steam-powered vessels from the merchant community, often
paying far greater prices than the ships were actually worth.
These vessels were subjected to hard use and, by the end of
the war, most were not fit to be returned to merchant
service. The people who sold their ships to the Union were
in no hurry to replace them with U.S. flag ships. Shipyards
were too backlogged with war orders to build merchant vessels
and there was no real protection from the Confederate
raiders. This resulted in skyrocketing insurance rates for
U.S. vessels, so many shipowners bought their ships from
foreign countries and registered them under foreign flags.
They got their ships faster, the Confederate raiders left
15
them alone, and operating and insurance rates were much
1 ower
.
The American maritime industry also lost its shipbuilding
advantage during this time period. The once-abundant timber
stands along the coast had been depleted and the world was
turning to steam-powered, iron ships. U.S. shipyards were to
slow to begin building iron-hulled, steam-powered,
screw-driven merchant ships CRef. £:p. 683 . And when U.S.
shipyards finally started turning out the modern vessels,
building costs were so high that American operators were
driven to buy their ships overseas and operate them under
foreign flag. In fact, by 1901, Americans had 136 ships
(670,000 tons) registered abroad CRef. 3:p. 9], Foreign
flag vessels did not require American crews and so even more
seagoing jobs drained away from the U.S. sailor. This caused
more people to leave the sea for the more stable sources of
income found on shore.
Throughout the years after the Civil War, some efforts
were made to regenerate the U.S. maritime industry. Many
plans were introduced and hotly debated in Congress. Some
plans were passed but none were particularly successful.
Some were even rocked by scandal and were not tried again for
years.
The lack of an adequate U.S. merchant marine was a
Congressional issue during the late nineteenth century but
there was no urgency attached to resolving the problem. This
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failing was dramatically displayed for all the world to see
by the sailing of President Theodore Roosevelt's Great White
Fleet. The Great White Fleet was sent on a cruise intended to
impress the world with the superiority of American naval
might and the technology of the new U.S. battleships.
Unfortunately, this force had to be fueled by a group of
undependab le, disreptuab le-look ing , foreign colliers. There
were no American merchant ships available to carry the coal
needed by the fleet and, as a result, Roosevelt's Great White
Fleet entered every port followed by a rag-tag group of
foreign flag support ships. The point was made and more
vigorous efforts were taken on the part of the government to
revitalize the U.S. maritime industry.
D. WORLD WAR I
World War I provided the first real incentive to the U.S.
to rebuild its merchant marine fleet. Ships were built and
sailors found to sail them. The manpower shortages that
might have occurred did not, probably because of the timing
of America's entry into the war and the war's ending.
President Woodrow Wilson arrived in the White House in
1913 with the intent to strengthen America's economic growth
and expansion. One part of his program included merchant
shipping reform. Wilson's plans for reforming the nation's
maritime industry were being presented to Congress as war
broke out in Europe. This made his task much easier because
17
it was immediately apparent to all observers that emergency
measures had to be taken.
At the start of World War I, less than 10 percent of
America's foreign trade was carried on U.S. ships CRef. 2: p.
1163. American trading was paralyzed as England, Germany,
Italy, and France withdrew their merchant fleets from
transatlantic service. What shipping space was available was
sold to the highest bidder, and insurance rates for ships and
cargo became enormously expensive.
At the same time that shipping out of America became
virtually nonexistent, American farmers produced one of the
greatest agricultural harvests in history. With no way to
export the surplus, prices were depressed and everyone
involved with the agricultural community—farmers, bankers,
and railroads—became concerned. Intense pressure was
brought to bear on the government to do something about the
problems faced by the American public.
Congress quickly passed legislation introduced by Wilson
for a Bureau of War Risk Insurance and a "free ships" act.
The free ships act allowed owners to register foreign ships
under the neutral American flag. New ships, both U.S. -owned
and foreign-owned, were quickly added to the U.S. registry,
and they began to pick up the routes abandoned by those at
war in Europe.
In 191^t, Wilson also introduced a bill that would grant
the national government the right to own and operate a
18
merchant fleet. This plan met with strong opposition from
the private sector. Business saw a government-owned
corporation, which was not subject to the laws of supply and
demand, as a threat to the free enterprise system. Wilson
tried to impress upon Congress the need for a strong merchant
marine to act as a naval auxiliary to protect the continued
neutrality of the United States. Neither Congress nor the
private sector lobbying against this plan were convinced of
the soundness of his argument. They believed that the same
isolated position that kept America out of the war also
eliminated the need for any type of naval auxiliary. Those
opposed to Wilson's plan were ultimately successful in their
efforts and the bill was tabled for two more years.
In 1915, the sinking of the Lusitania with the loss of
128 American lives made it much easier for Wilson to sell his
plan for a merchant marine to act as a naval auxiliary CRef.
2:p. 1203. It was now generally accepted by the public that
a strong merchant marine, with a strong navy to protect it,
had the ability to preserve America's commercial and
political neutrality. Consequently, in August 1916, the
Shipping Act of 1916 was passed by Congress and signed into
law
.
The Shipping Act established a five-member Shipping Board
that was allowed to purchase, lease, charter, or build ships
for commercial operation by the government. The new agency
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had no time to get organized before the U.S. entered the war
in April 1917.
The Shipping Board began a massive requisitioning of
ships and shipyards as soon as the war began. They forced
the charter of many neutral-country ships and commandeered
captured enemy vessels into service to carry American
supplies overseas. The Board also began a massive building
effort in American shipyards, but their efforts were never
enough during the war years. Their building effort caused
the construction of 1 , ^t09 oceangoing ships, the bulk of
which, unfortunately, were delivered after the armistice was
signed CRef. ^
:
p . 5D. As a result, the question of manning
these ships during wartime was never raised.
E. THE SECOND DECLINE
After the war, too many ships became a world wide
problem. The available labor force was hit by the shipping
depression and declined again. The methods used by the ship
operators of the day helped lay the groundwork for the
militant labor organizations that appeared in the 1930s. The
labor agreements that followed the organization of the
maritime unions significantly increased the cost of operating
American flag ships. This contributed to the decline of the
U.S shipping industry and the number of jobs available in the
industry
.
Despite the massive destruction of shipping during the
war, after fighting had stopped the world discovered the
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greatest surplus of merchant vessels ever known. Most of the
surplus shipping* and the most powerful merchant fleet in the
world, was owned by the United States. The U.S., however,
had not counted on the intense building and buying efforts
that would be put forth by its European Allies to regain
their prewar trade status. The surplus of ships and massive
efforts to regain prewar trade position combined with the
onset of a worldwide recession in the 1920s to help decrease
freight rates and send all shipping into a decline.
Most of the surplus U.S. ships were owned by the Shipping
Board, and, in compliance with the law that required
government ownership of a merchant fleet only in time of
emergency, the Board made an effort to dispose of its ships.
This task proved to be nearly impossible in the face of the
worldwide shipping depression, and the Shipping Board was
finally forced to ask Congress for help. After much debate,
Congress passed the Merchant Marine Act of 1920. Although
ship disposal was the goal of the Merchant Marine Act of
1920, it is more noted for providing the first statement of a
national maritime policy that recognized the need for a
strong merchant fleet for purposes of commercial advantage
and defense. This statement of national policy has remained
basically the same since 1920.
One of the most enduring and direct results of the
Merchant Marine Act of 1920 was its reaffirmation of cabotage
practices. Cabotage reserves all coastal trade, including
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trade with offshore possessions, to ships that are U.S.
built, U.S. flag, and manned by U.S. citizen crews. This law
provides the only stable work environment for a small part of
the maritime industry.
Labor also contributed to the decline of the U.S.
maritime industry. The Seaman's Act of 1915 provided
American seamen with rights when aboard a ship. Prior to
this Act, once a sailor signed a Ship's Articles, he was
".
. . practically a slave." CRef. 5:p. 683 The important
aspect of this act, for the organization of maritime labor,
was its provision that sailors were no longer liable to be
imprisoned if they went on strike. From 1915 until the
1920's seamen made great gains in wages and living conditions
aboard ship. In the 1920s, as jobs became scarce because of
the shipping depression, operators began to cut their
operating costs by eroding seamen's wages and benefits. Many
seamen felt the operators took unfair advantage of them
during this time and a core of resentment built up that was
instrumental in determining the types of tactics and demands
made by the unions that evolved after the shipping
depression
.
General U.S. union growth was induced by the National
Industrial Recovery Act in 193*+ under the Roosevelt
Administration CRef. 6:p. 1053. The maritime unions were no
exception and, through their strike efforts between 193<^ and
1938, they firmly established themselves as a strong force to
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be dealt with in the U.S. maritime industry. The strikes
entered into by the maritime unions succeeded in immobilizing
shipping operations along the entire west coast for months at
a time. Unions would strike because of disagreements with
ship operators or with other unions. The maritime unions
have a long history of bitter in-fighting that occurred as
they fought for more members and job control. While these
strikes greatly improved life for seafarers, they ultimately
hurt the U.S. maritime industry. Shippers found other means
of transporting their cargo and often the cargo did not
return to American flag vessels once the strike was over
CRef. 5:p. 703.
In 1936, Congress passed the Merchant Marine Act of 1936.
This Act adopted both a nationalist and protectionist
approach to U.S. maritime affairs. The Federal Maritime
Commission (FMC) was created to replace the Shipping Board
which was established in 1916. The FMC was given the power
to build and charter ships for operation on essential trade
routes when private enterprise could not or would not provide
them. The Act also established direct subsidies for ship
operators to offset the higher costs of building and
operating U.S. vessels. It required subsidized lines to
establish building funds to replace their older ships and
provided loans and mortgage insurance. A training program
for American seamen was also established under the Act.
23
The Maritime Commission undertook a building program to
replace the merchant fleet's old, worn-out ships which were
mainly built during World War I. In preparation for this
work, shipyards were modernized and new yards were built.
F. WORLD WAR II
World War II is the first time manpower shortages for
U.S. vessels are recorded. The maritime industry had been
shrinking in size since the end of World War I; World War II
required massive building of merchant ships to carry U.S.
supplies overseas. The increased need for sailors quickly
outstripped the number of trained sailors available. This
manpower shortage problem continued to exist until the end of
the war
.
All of the changes in American shipping policy were
taking place while Europe was poised on the brink of war.
When the war broke out, U.S. shipyards had such a good
reputation that the British government bought many of its
ships from the U.S.
The Maritime Commission performed a Herculean task during
World War II. They provided more than enough ships for the
war effort. This was even after being allowed little
preparation or organizational time before the U.S. actually
entered the war. During the war, the U.S., through the
efforts of the Federal Maritime Commission, built 5,695
merchant ships CRef. 2:p. 1783.
2<*
Manning merchant ships during World War II proved to be a
bigger problem than obtaining ships. Before the war began,
there were approximately 60,000 men and officers serving in
the U.S. merchant marine CRef. 2:p. 1953. At the beginning
of the war, the merchant marine suffered heavy casualties.
Six months into the conflict, 350 ships with over 3,000
merchant seamen on board were lost CRef. 2:p. 199]. These
losses, combined with the fact that in the early days of the
war delayed ship sailings due to manpower shortages were
averaging about <^5 a month, caused the War Shipping
Administration and the unions to quickly institute recruiting
and training programs CRef. 2:p. 1953. Over 200 training
centers were established throughout the U.S. to train
merchant seamen CRef. 2:p. 1973.
Militarization of the U.S. merchant marine, a measure
that had been adopted by Great Britain, was proposed but
never instituted. Large war bonuses and a massive
advertising campaign for merchant mariners were utilized
instead. Unfortunately, the problems of recruiting and
training personnel and the manning of U.S. merchant ships
during the war was never suitably resolved.
G. THE THIRD DECLINE
After World War II, the U.S. government sold more than
2,000 of its ^,500 merchant ships CRef. 3:p. 173. These were
sold first to American citizens, then to the Allied countries
and finally, on a limited basis to those defeated during
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World War II. About 1,400 of the remaining ships were placed
in the U.S. National Defense Reserve Fleet ( NDRF ) for
purposes of emergency mobilization. The NDRF would now be
the extra shipping capability needed to support emergency
needs. The number of ships in the NDRF was known, the number
of people needed to man them could be calculated, yet no
efforts were made to insure that there were people available
in the industry to man the ships. The U.S. maritime industry
was once again cut adrift by the U.S. government to fend for
itself in the world maritime environment. The numbers of
ships have declined and with them the number of jobs
available to an ever decreasing labor force.
American ship operators soon found themselves competing
against nationalized foreign competitors and lower-cost
private foreign companies. Many American operators again
resorted to the practice of registering their vessels under
foreign flags. This helped to decrease their operating and
acquisition costs, as well as provide them with greater
operating flexibility and tax advantages. As the ships
drained away to flags of convenience countries, so too did
the jobs for U.S. merchant seamen who were manning them.
One way U.S. operators try to compete with their
international competitors is by holding down their capital
acquisition costs for as long as possible. Because of the
expense involved in replacing old ships in the U.S., American
companies use their ships longer than the rest of the world.
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Thus, while the rest of the world maritime community was
moving to bigger, more energy efficient, diesel vessels,
American operators were still using steam-driven, inefficient
vessels. This placed the U.S industry even farther behind
its foreign competitors in a marketplace in which every
operating advantage must be used to its fullest extent.
U.S. ships are steadily declining in number. In
September of 198<^, the total number of active U.S. flag ships
included ^+08 vessels CRef. 7:p. 103. According to Bureau of
Statistics figures, by December 1984- there were only 4-01
active U.S. flag ships. Even though the number of ships is
declining, the amount of deadweight tonnage has remained
fairly stable. On a tonnage basis, the U.S. flag fleet ranks
eighth in the world CRef. 7:p. 93. However, larger ships for
U.S. operators does not mean larger U.S. crews are required
to man them. The newer, larger ships being acquired by the
U.S. flag ship lines are technically advanced, and require
smaller crews. U.S. flag operators who used to require 35 to
t+0 people to man their ships now require only 21 or 22 men
CRef. 8:p. 653. Unskilled, entry level jobs are being
eliminated, especially in the engineering department. New
engineering plants allow ships to be run from the bridge of
the ship and require only two or three people in the engine
room.
Government assistance in the form of direct subsidies has
all but disappeared CRef. 9:p. 333. Cargo preference for
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government cargo exists, but it provides only a portion of
the cargo necessary to maintain an active U.S. flag fleet.
The Department of Defense is hiring merchant mariners to man
its preposi t ioned fleets. Military Sealift Command has hired
contract crews to man its new Fast Sealift Ships (FSS), its
new surveillance (T-AGDS) ships, the new Navy crane ships
(T-ACS), and the new hospital ships (T-AH). These are all
providing jobs for merchant mariners in an effort to stop the
drain of the labor pool that is a result of seafaring jobs
disappearing with the U.S. flag fleet.
H. SUMMARY
The history of the U.S. maritime industry suggests that
only in times of war does the government really interest
itself in helping to improve the merchant fleet. This
periodic lack of concern has contributed to a.rt unstable
industry for workers. Today, the industry is again on the
decline and the number of jobs and workers are decreasing
with the number of ships. Activation of the RRF will provide
a sudden increase in the number jobs available; but are there
enough people left in the industry to fill them?
E8
Ill . MARITIME MANPOWER
A. INTRODUCTION
The minimum number of seafarers required by U.S. law for
the operation of a ship is less than have actually been used.
U.S. seafarers wage rates and other benefits that have been
gained through union negotiations have increased manpower
costs for U.S. flag operators. Industry practices make it
impossible to hire non-union crews? so ship operators have
resorted to decreasing crew sizes in order to cut costs. As
the crew sizes decrease so too do the skills available aboard
the ships. Training to bring younger people into the
industry continues but at a slower pace. The lack of
seagoing jobs forced the unions to essentially close their
books to many new members. As the industry grows more
technologically advanced, frequent upgrading of training is
required
.
The RRF depends upon these same seafarers and their
skills. Declining crew sizes mean declining job
opportunities for those in the industry. The lack of
seagoing jobs means fewer people entering the industry, which
can lead to serious manpower shortages should the RRF be
activated. Fully-manned, the RRF ships will require
approximately 5,000 skilled mariners after 1991. Work
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practices within the industry have led to a steady increase
in the age of unlicensed seamen.
The maritime industry will have to provide the crews for
the RRF ships. Unfortunately, the U.S. maritime industry may
not be capable of providing the people necessary to man the
RRF.
B. BACKGROUND
By tradition, U.S. flag vessels are organized into three
departments: deck, engineering, and steward. Table 1
provides a listing of the ratings and officers typically
found in each department. All ratings have different skills
and are paid at different rates. The U.S. Coast Guard is
responsible for issuing licenses to officers and certificates
of service to unlicensed personnel. The rules governing the
issuance of these documents are found in Title *+6 of the Code
of Federal Regulations . Rules for manning the ships follow
national and international conventions as well as company and
union agreements. The manning level of a ship is usually a
function of the class and technology of the ship, and the
type of service it provides. The U.S. Coast Guard ( USCG
)
provides guidance and enforcement of U.S. manning regulations
for U.S. flag ships.
The most significant of the manning laws is known as the





U.S. MERCHANT SHIPBOARD ORGANIZATION
Ship's Master
DECK DEPARTMENT ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT STEWARD DEPARTMENT
Licensed Officers
Chief Mate Chief Engineer
Second Mate l m + Assistant Engineer
Third Mate S ,",c' Engineer
Junior Third Mate 3^** Engineer
Unlicensed Seamen
Ship's Boatswain Electricians Cooks
Able Bodied Seaman Reefer Specialists Bakers




The Ship's Purser, Chief Steward, and Radio Officer a.r& all
unlicensed Staff Officers also attached to the ship.
Source: Derived from lecture at the Navy School of Physical
Distribution Management, 8 March 198^-.
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On a merchant vessel of more than 100 gross tons . . . the
licensed individuals, sailors, coal passers, firemen,
oilers and water tenders shall be divided, when at sea,
into at least three watches, and shall be kept on duty
successively to perform ordinary work incident to the
operation and management of the vessel.
The law was established for reasons of safety and not
conditions of labor CRef. l:p. 1013. Under this law, the
minimum crew consists of:
* one licensed master;
* three licensed mates;
* three qualified deck sailors;
* three licensed engineers; and
* enough unlicensed engine-room personnel to have three per
watch. CRef. l:pp. 99-1113
Actual crew sizes have been and usually are larger due to
personnel in the steward department and union quality of work
life agreements. The Maritime Administration (MARAD) must
also approve manning levels if a vessel operates under
subsidy or has been built with government funding guarantees.
Manning costs are one part of the high cost of operating
U.S. flag vessels. Ship operators are successfully reducing
their operating costs by reducing the sizes of their crews
through the use of overtime, union contract renegotiations,
technological upgrades, purchasing newer, larger, more
advanced ships, and moving many shipboard responsibilities
ashore. In the past, the ratio of seamen per billet for a
ship has been 2:1, which means each ship billet is filled by
a different seaman every six months CRef. l:p. 263.
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Technological changes have contributed greatly to a
reduction in the number of personnel needed to man ships. One
of the areas where manning levels have been successfully
reduced is in the engineering department. Technological
innovations in the engine-room include remote control of main
propulsion machinery from the bridge and an alarmed remote
sensor to monitor engine operating conditions. These
innovations remove the requirement for 2^-hour watch standing
in the engine-room. Further automation of the engineering
spaces can greatly reduce the need for human operation of the
propulsion plant. Maintenance, repair and inspection are the
few operations required to be performed by people. CRef. l:p.
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Maintenance and repair functions have also been affected
by technological change. Modular technology has reduced the
need for personnel to perform extensive repairs to the
engines while at sea. Malfunctions can be traced by
automatic monitoring systems and inoperative modules quickly
replaced. Condition monitoring systems can identify
potential equipment problems that can be repaired while the
ship is in port. This reduces the number of equipment
problems encountered at sea and the need for large numbers of
skilled repair personnel at sea.
Computers have become an integral part of the stowing and
routing process for many ships CRef. 10:p. 1^1. Because the
cargo stowage plan can already be drawn up for the ship
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before it pulls into port, turnaround time for the ships is
greatly reduced. The Master and First Mate are relieved of
much of their planning efforts and the ship is not kept
waiting while they inspect and plan how to stow the cargo.
Ship routes are determined automatically according to the
fastest, most economical route allowing for weather
cond i t ions
.
These innovations have led to the elimination of many
seagoing billets. They have also led to a proliferation of
shipping consultants ashore. Skilled licensed seamen who can
no longer find jobs at sea are finding jobs ashore telling
shippers and underwriters the best way to protect their
investments at sea. CRef . 103 Unfortunately, the combined
losses of seagoing jobs that are due to technological
improvements and those due to the declining number of U.S.
flag vessels, is considerable. Even though there are still
merchant seamen, they are going to sea less and their
seafaring skills will begin to deteriorate over time. In the
event of a mass requirement for merchant mariners, it is
questionable whether those left in the maritime industry will
have retained the necessary skills.
Over time, the number of seafaring jobs available to
merchant mariners has fallen consistently, except in times of
emergency. Table S provides the number of jobs for all
seamen in the U.S. over the past twenty years. Jobs began to
decline after World War II when there were 168,000 billets
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TABLE 2
AVERAGE MONTHLY SEAFARING EMPLOYMENT AVAILABLE
TO ALL U. S. MERCHANT SEAMEN (1964-1984)


























available CRef. l:p. 93. Increases in jobs occur during
wartime or other emergencies as can be seen in the table. The
increases in available jobs that occurred in 1966 and 1967
were attributable to the Vietnam build-up and the increases
in 1976 and 1978 were due to a sharp rise in Soviet grain
shipments. For the time period shown, the total number of
U.S. seafaring billets dropped by 60 percent. Jobs in the
industry were lost at an average rate of about four percent
each year. The active seafaring workforce available to fill
the 19,193 billets in 1984 was 34,000 people CRef. ll:p. ill.
Taking into account the decline in U.S. flag ships, manning
reduction efforts in the industry, and the attrition of those
seamen who entered the industry during World War II, the
active workforce expected to be available by 1990 is 31,000
people CRef. 12: p. 513. Barring a major war in the next
five or six years, the trend of losing seafaring billets can
be expected to continue CRef. 19D.
C. ENTRY TO THE INDUSTRY
Through their hiring halls, the unions control the entry
of workers to the maritime industry. Strikes and government
arbitration decisions gave this exclusive right of hiring to
the union halls between 1934 and 1936. Now the union hiring
hall is the only way a person can get a job aboard any U.S.
flag vessel. Shipping companies contract with different
unions to fill billets on ships. When seafarers are needed,
the shipping firm calls the local union hall they have
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contracted with and requests the number of" people needed. The
union determines who to send based upon seniority. The
unions have developed a unique seniority system for their
members.
Members are grouped into one of three seniority groups.
The groups are based upon time served, but there is no
seniority ranking within a particular group. Applicants from
seniority Group I will be sent to jobs before Group II or
Group III applicants. Group II applicants are sent before
Group III applicants, and Group III applicants are sent
before those who have no prior experience on U.S. flag
vessels. CRef. 5:p. 72J The general procedure for matching
seamen with jobs is as follows:
. . . a seaman registers with his local union hall and
receives a registration card valid for a specific time
period with the date and time registered, his rating . . .,
and his seniority group marked on the card. Job openings
are sent to the hall by contracted shipping companies in
the area, posted on the notice boards, and called at set
intervals. When a job is called, any qualified seaman can
bid for the opening .... The seaman with the oldest
registration card in the highest seniority group among
those cards submitted is dispatched to the job. CRef. 13:p.
221]
This procedure has been followed and assignments made on
a local basis for years. Table 3 shows the effect of these
hiring practices on a depressed industry. Radio Officers are
predicted to be phased out of the ship's organization by
1991. As can be seen from the table, Radio Officers show an
increase in median age as each year goes by. No new
people are entering the industry and those who ars young
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enough, and junior enough within the seniority groupings are
leaving the industry. Unlicensed seamen show much of the
same trend as the Radio Officers. Job losses in the industry
and the older, more senior workers holding on to their jobs
until they qualify for their pensions are preventing the
introduction of newer, younger people into the industry.
CRef. 233
TABLE 3
MEDIAN AGES OF SEAMEN UNDER ARTICLES SERVING ABOARD
U.S. SHIPS GREATER THAN 1000 GROSS WEIGHT TONS
Department 1981 1982 1983 1984
Radio 54.5 55.1 55.9 56.6
Unl icensed
Deck 50.6 51.2 52.1 52.8
Engineering 50.3 50.9 51.8 52.3
Cooks &« Stewards 52.6 52.9 53.5 54.2
Source: Derived from U.S. Maritime Administration
stat ist ics.
Hiring hall practices have also served to limit the
effective utilization of a union's manpower by providing
assignments only on a local basis. However, with the
introduction of computers, this method of job assignment is
changing. The Seaman's International Union (SIU), a union
for unlicensed seamen, has changed its personnel management
practices drastically. The SIU developed a comprehensive
personnel data base on their IBM 4341 which is located at the
Harry Ludenberg School of Seamanship in Piney Point,
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Maryland. This data base contains information on skills,
training, location, and availability for employment of every
SIU member. Now, when the local SIU union halls get a call
from a contracted shipping company for personnel, that order
is forwarded to Piney Point, where the job is actually
filled. The name of the man assigned to the job is forwarded
to the requesting union hall and they make the arrangements
to transport the member to the job, if he is not in the local
area. Transportation costs are paid by the ship operator.
The manpower management capability provided by this data base
has enabled the SIU to operate from a nationwide base rather
than a regional one. Jobs will not go unfilled or workers
unemployed because each was available in different locations.
Presently, the SIU is the only union with this personnel
management capability.
D. TRAINING
The safety and operating requirements for U.S. flag ships
are the most stringent among maritime nations. In the United
States, seamanship has become a profession, and training is
required to become an active part of that profession. Both
licensed and unlicensed seamen undergo extensive training for
entry to the field. They must also update that training at
various intervals throughout their careers. CRef. <^:p. 186]
Seven unions have established eight schools in various
locations to keep their members up to date on the changing
technology of the newer ships that are beginning to make up
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the U.S. flag fleet. Unlicensed union schools provide the
entry skills training necessary for young people to enter the
profession. These schools also provide upgrade training and
recer t if icat ion programs to help their members advance.
There are two schools for unlicensed seamen; one is
sponsored by the Seaman's International Union and the other
by the National Maritime Union ( NMU ) . Five of the licensed
officers unions sponsor six schools for their members. All
eight schools are Coast Guard—approved and include vocational
and academic courses. The schools are jointly funded by the
unions and the shipping operators through collective
bargaining agreements.
The Merchant Marine Act of 1936 established a training
program for American seamen. This eventually took the form
of the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy in King's Point, New
York. The school trains men and women to become licensed
officers in the U.S. merchant marine. They receive classroom
training and spend a year at sea on U.S. flag vessels.
Graduates receive U.S. Coast Guard licenses as deck officers,
engineering officers, or both. They also receive Bachelor of
Science degrees as the Academy is a fully-accredited
university. Graduates of the Merchant Marine Academy incur a
five year sailing obligation for the U.S. merchant marine.
Students for the school are nominated and appointed in the
same manner as for the U.S. military academies.
^0
There are also six State maritime academies. They are
located at Vallejo, California; Castine, Maine; Buzzards Bay,
Massachusetts; Traverse City, Michigan; Fort Schuyler, New
York; and Galveston, Texas. All of these schools, except
Traverse City, are four-year institutions and award Bachelor
of Science degrees. All the schools award Coast Guard
licenses. The federal government provides financial
assistance to these schools under Public Law 96-453, the
Maritime Education and Training Act of 1980. This law
provides incentive payments of S1E00 each to students at the
academies. Students who participate in the incentive payment
program incur a three-year sailing obligation with the U.S.
merchant marine. Qualified graduates of programs at either
the state or federal level may be commissioned as ensigns in
the U.S. Naval Reserve.
In response to the declining number of jobs available in
the U.S. merchant fleet, MARAD has been following a policy of
reductions in the size of classes admitted to King's Point.
They are also awarding fewer incentive payments to students
in the state academies. This attempt by MARAD to decrease
the projected oversupply of merchant officers has been offset
by the fact that the state academies have collectively
expanded their enrollment even as MARAD decreases theirs.
Each year, maritime academies graduate about 1,000 new
merchant marine officers. Of that 1,000, only 20-30 percent
find seagoing employment, this includes those who accept
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commissions in the U.S. Naval Reserve CRef. 23D . However,
the licensed officers, unlike the unlicensed crewmen have
already bypassed their obsolescence block of. older mariners
waiting to retire. A younger workforce is being developed in
the deck and engineering officer ranks. The median age for
licensed seamen is actually declining. With an attrition
rate of about six to eight percent per year, the licensed
ranks are rebuilding their numbers after a large number of
retirements between 1981 and 1983 CRef. 831.
E. U.S. MANNING PROBLEMS
The U . S. merchant marine seems to incur shortages only
in wartime. In peacetime, there are always more than enough
seamen available to man the ships. The first documented case
of maritime manpower shortages occurred during World War II.
During the Korean War, the number of seagoing billets
increased from 57,000 to 87,000 in only one year CRef. 14:p.
403. This 53 percent increase could not be met by the
available workforce. Many ship sailings were delayed because
of significant shortages of licensed radio operators,
engineers, and able-bodied seamen.
Curiously, the manpower shortages that occurred during
the Vietnam Conflict are reflected only in the government
reports of the time. During Vietnam there were a peak number
of 178 GAA vessels operating CRef. 16:p. 63. The GAA was
much the same as it is today.
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Part of the research done for this thesis was to write
letters to all the known holders of GAA ' s for RRF ships and
the unions of those general agents. There were 11 general
agents and 13 unions contacted. Replies were received from
about a third of each. Questions concerning manning problems
encountered by each during the Vietnam Conflict resulted in
some surprising answers. Most of the respondents reported
encountering little or no problems during Vietnam.
Nevertheless, statistics show that there were serious
manpower shortages during the Vietnam Conflict. These
shortages delayed over 1,540 sailings for a total of 2,859
days between 1966 and 1969 CRef. 15:p. 30 and Ref . 16: p.
393. The estimated additional costs to the government because
of these delays due to crew shortages was approximately
$7, 089,400 between 1966 and 1968 CRef. 15:p. 313. The
shortages continued until the Vietnam sealift began to wind
down in the early 1970s, despite Selective Service
occupational deferments for categories of seamen in short
supply and massive recruiting efforts on the parts of MARAD
and MSC.
F. D0D MEASURES
From a military viewpoint, the decreases in the U.S. flag
fleet and its resulting manpower losses are a threat to the
security of the nation. A history of manpower shortages for
manning ships during wartime is what has D0D concerned about
adequate manning for the RRF. Shortages and delayed sailings
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during the surge shipping segment of the RRF mission could
make a big difference in the outcome of the conflict. Steps
taken by DOD to solve the problems associated with a
declining seafaring workforce include: more extensive
contracting for manning of Navy support vessels, creation of
the Merchant Marine Reserve ( MMR ) Program, and RRF
act i vat ions
.
MSC has significantly increased its use of contract
manning for support of Navy operations in the past few years.
The Near Term Preposi t ioning Force ( NTPF ) which is located in
the Indian Ocean has 15 of its 17 ships manned by merchant
mariners. The 13 ships that will comprise the Maritime
Preposi t ioning Force ( MPF ) will all be manned by merchant
seamen. The new fast sealift ships (FSS), the aviation
logistics support ships ( T-AVB ) , the hospital ships (T-AH),
and the auxiliary crane ships (T-ACS) maintain contract
skeleton crews at all times and, when activated, are fully
crewed by contracted merchant seamen. Many of the MSC
special mission support ships, which provide support for
specialized scientific and technical missions for DOD
sponsors, are manned by contract crews.
Another method designed to insure a contingent of
merchant officers during emergency situations is the Merchant
Marine Reserve (MMR) Program. Officers in the MMR provide
the link between merchant ships and U.S. Navy vessels that
operate together during emergency situations. The Merchant
£*<+
Marine Reserve officers receive commissions in the U.S. Naval
Reserve; their designator is 16XX. In the event forces are
mobilized, the 16XX officers remain in the merchant fleet to
perform their liaison mission.
Most of their Naval Reserve work is done through
correspondence courses. Naval Reserve Officers have two
weeks of active duty per year in order to train with Naval
units. However, according to officials at the Chief of Naval
Reserves, a major problem with the two-week training program
is that the MMR officers are in competition with Naval
Academy and ROTC midshipmen for space aboard Navy ships for
training. Midshipmen are given priority for the available
training slots and MMR officers end up spending their two
weeks of training in firefighting school or some similar
occupat ion.
Qualified graduates of the maritime academies are offered
the opportunity to become a part of the MMR. Those students
who received government assistance while attending school and
do not accept commissions in either the Navy or Marine Corps
are required to become a part of the MMR for the period of
their sailing obligation. Students at all academies are
exposed to the MMR program as well as many aspects of the
U.S. Navy and Marine Corps through the Naval Science
Departments that have been established at the schools.
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The number of people participating in the MMR fluctuates.
In October 1985, there were approximately 3700 people in the
program CRef. 2^3.
RRF activations provided actual at-sea time for the
merchant mariners aboard the RRF ships. The ships are
activated for at least 30 days and usually operate with
military forces. RRF activations provide unique training
opportunities for those merchant seamen who man them.
G. SUMMARY
Job shortages in the maritime industry are the result of
several factors: the declining number of U.S. flag vessels,
efforts by operators to reduce crew sizes, and the increasing
sophistication of the technology aboard ships that has
reduced the need for human labor. U.S. regulations for crew
size are based upon the need for safety of operation. As
ships become more technically advanced and self-monitoring,
the larger crews required for safety and maintenance ar& no
longer required. Fewer graduates of the Maritime academies
are finding employment at sea. Jobs that used to be found on
board ships are now being moved to shore, as operators cut
their crew costs by passing many shipboard responsibilities
(like cargo stowage and repair functions) to the shippers and
underwr i ters
.
As the present workforce retires, the job shortage
problem will become less problematic. Unfortunately, the
resulting balance of supply and demand of labor will be
•
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adequate to meet peacetime demands only. Activation of the
RRF will severely tax the available labor supply.
Past experiences in wartime situations, suggest that
manning shortages for RRF ships will happen. Some steps have
been taken by MARAD and DOD to ensure an adequate supply of
personnel to meet the manning needs of the RRF ships. DOD is
providing jobs within the industry to maintain the number of
seafarers available. MARAD and DOD are sponsoring training
programs that provide the necessary training to merchant
mariners for the operation of the RRF ships.
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IV. THE READY RESERVE FORCE
A. INTRODUCTION
The present Ready Reserve Force, when fully activated,
will require approximately 3,000 men to man the ships. By
1991, this figure will rise to about 5,000 men. The RRF and
its manning problems were created as a result of shipping
capability shortfalls that first appeared during World War II
and then for each armed conflict that followed. The
responsibility for providing the manpower for RRF ships is as
diverse as the process of maintaining and activating the
ships. No one, yet everyone, is responsible for getting RRF
ships underway. The RRF ships and their crews are vital to
the success of U.S. war efforts. To understand the problems
with manning RRF ships, it is first necessary to understand
the history, participants, and make-up of the RRF.
B. BACKGROUND
After World War II, the U.S. government placed
approximately 1,^00 of the merchant ships it built during the
war into the National Defense Reserve Fleet ( NDRF ) . This
fleet of ships was to be preserved and maintained in a
condition that would allow responsive activation in times of
economic and military emergencies. Ships from the NDRF were
activated for the Grain Storage Program in the 1950s, to
provide extra sealift capacity during the Korean Conflict,
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during the Suez Canal Crisis in 1956, during the Berlin
Resupply, and to provide military logistical support in
Vietnam CRef. 14:p. 403. However, as the age of its ships
increased, the capability of the NDRF to meet emergency needs
in a timely manner declined.
In 1976, an analysis was done by the Maritime
Administration (MARAD) to determine the time required to
break ships out of the NDRF and have them ready for
deployment. The study showed that NDRF ships could not be
made ready in time to meet the Navy's critical time windows.
What the Navy required in five to ten days, MARAD could
provide in 30 to 40 days CRef. 15:p. 40 3. The reasons for
this long activation period included: the average NDRF ship
was 30 years old; ships in the NDRF were maintained in the
same condition as when they were laid up; the preservation
and maintenance practices for the NDRF did not include
activities that kept the ship within five to ten days of
deployment; and, one of MARAD ' s more serious problems, the
nonavailability of ship repair and dry dock facilities to
prepare the ships for sea when needed CRef. 14:p. 423.
After evaluating and discarding several different plans
to meet the perceived military needs, the Navy and MARAD
finally decided that the best way to solve the problem was to
establish a special cadre of ships within the NDRF. These
ships were initially drawn from the NDRF and upgraded to meet
required activation standards. These ships became the Ready
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Reserve Force ( RRF ) . RRF ships were maintained in states of
five-, ten-, and twenty-day readiness for activation. A
Memorandum of Understanding between the Navy and the
Department of Commerce was signed in 1976, formally
establishing the RRF. The Navy determined the specific ship
mix and type, total number of ships, and future changes in
the composition of the RRF subject to MARAD agreement [Ref
.
15:p. <tl] .
Management of the RRF is a joint venture between MARAD
and the Navy. MARAD owns the ships and controls repair and
maintenance of the ships. They also are responsible for
providing the ships to the Navy manned, provisioned, and
ready to deploy should the RRF be activated. The Navy
controls the activation of the RRF ships and funds the costs
of procurement, upgrade, maintenance, activation, and
exerc ises
.
MARAD performs its manning, provisioning, and activation
duties through the use of General Agency Agreements ( GAA )
These contracts are awarded to commercial ship agents who
manage the ships for the government. The GAA outline the
responsibilities of the general agents when RRF ships are
activated. These responsibilities include:
* Establish communications and liaison with MARAD regional
office, Reserve Fleet sites, government and commercial
outport layberth sites, activation facilities, U.S. Coast
Guard, American Bureau of Shipping ( ABS ) , Federal
Communications Commission (FCC), tug/towing companies, and
ship chandler, husbanding and bunkering firms.
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* Order linehandlers and tugs for outport layberth sites.
* Assure diver availability for removal of underwater
blanks on ship arrival at activation facility.
* Assign a port engineer to each activation facility.
* Reguest ship crewing from Seafarer Unions.
* Oversee and coordinate the activation work as the
activation facilities.
* Recommend granting of U.S. Coast Guard, and FCC
certification waivers.
* Report activation status to MARAD.
* Conduct sea trials.
* Initiate action to resolve activation problems. CRef.
15:p. ^+13
An additional reguirement will be added to the GAA in the
near future CRef. 193. General agents will soon be required
to provide familiarization training aboard their RRF ships.
Concerns that the new engineering officers entering the
merchant marine might not be familiar with the old steam
propulsion plants aboard the RRF ships and that deck
personnel lack the skills and knowledge required to operate
new military sealift cargo gear are leading to this training
reguirement CRef. 173. For each type of vessel under
contract, the general agent will be required to conduct one
week familiarization training, twice a year. Twelve or so
key personnel will receive this training. Each session will
train different people from the available labor pool. The
training will be provided to both licensed and unlicensed
seamen. The general agents will be responsible for
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maintaining a list of names of the people who have received
the training and providing those names to the unions with
their RRF crew orders. The unions have apparently agreed to
assign personnel who have received the training to RRF ships
CRef. 193. One of the general agents, Interocean Management
Corporation, has already taken steps similar to these new
requirements. They are making every effort to insure that
there are trained crews available for the RRF ships that they
manage CRef. E03.
C. PURPOSE OF THE READY RESERVE FORCE
Strategic sealift support for a contingency includes
three major types of shipping. These are, preposi t ioned
shipping, surge shipping, and resupply shipping. Surge
shipping sealifts the bulk of equipment and initial
sustaining supplies that are based in the Continental United
States to points where it is required overseas. Resupply
shipping immediately follows to meet daily consumption needs
and build up reserve stock levels. CRef. 17:p. 33 Surge
shipping is critical to the support of overseas operations
requiring large amounts of combat equipment. The surge
shipping capability will be required within a matter of days
after a National Command Authorities < NCA ) decision to deploy
forces is made. People and ships must be immediately
available to fulfill this mission.
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The RRF is one of three sources for this surge shipping
capability CRef. 17:p. 83. After its surge shipping duties
are over, the RRF provides resupply shipping capabilities for
as long as resupply shipping is needed. The activation
process for Ready Reserve ships begins with an assessment by
Military Sealift Command (MSC) of shipping capability
shortages. The MSC reports this assessment and its
recommendations to alleviate the shortages to the Chief of
Naval Operations (CNO), Strategic Sealift Division (OP-42).
The CNO, in coordination with the Joint Chiefs of Staff
( JCS ) , determines the number of RRF ships required to meet
the shortage. The Navy sends a message to MARAD requesting
the RRF ships needed by type, number, and location. MARAD
then prepares the ships for sea and makes them available to
the MSC who will exercise control over them for the duration
of their activation. CRef. 18:pp. I 19 - I 201
D. READY RESERVE FORCE SHIPS
The RRF ships will be manned by merchant mariners. Most
of the RRF ships are located at one of three sites—James
River, Virginia; Beaumont, Texas; Suisun Bay, California.
Present plans are that those ships with ten- and twenty-day
readiness requirements will remain in these locations. Those
RRF ships with five-day readiness requirements will be
relocated near loadout ports. This relocation of the
five-day ships should help to avoid problems of congestion at
RRF sites, reduce towing requirements, and place ships closer
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to activation facilities, all of which should enhance early
ship arrival onberth for contingency loadout. Another
advantage of relocation of the RRF ships is that they will be
more readily available for crew familiarization training.
Manning requirements will also be spread over a wider area of
responsibility. There is a better chance that the local
unions will be able to provide adequate manpower within
prescribed time windows.
Table ^ provides a listing, by location, of the RRF as of
May 13, 1985. The table also provides information concerning
the ship type, its age in years, and the name of the company
assigned as general agent. This listing provides the names of
only 62 ships. Current MARAD and Navy plans are that the RRF
will consist of 116 ships by 1991 CRef. 17:p. 273.
The table shows that the average age of RRF ships is 23.8
years. All ships in the RRF are in good operating condition
and can be relied upon in case of emergency. The reason the
ships are so old can be attributed to how they are obtained.
The newer RRF ships are obtained from the U.S. maritime
industry. As the industry switches to newer, larger
container ships, MARAD purchases the ships that ar& to be
retired, but which still have a useful life. Unlike the
newer ships being built today, most of the RRF ships are
capable of offloading their own cargo. This is especially
important as military cargo is often offloaded in areas with
no developed port facilities. Ships have been added to the
5<+
TABLE 4
LISTING OF SHIPS IN THE READY RESERVE FORCE
BY LOCATION
SHIP LOCATION: James River, Virginia
SHIP NAHE SHIP TYPE AGE
(Years)
6ENERAL A6ENT
SS CATAWBA VICTORY Cargo 40 Auburn Shipping [APEX)
•SS LAKE Cargo 24 Moore HcCoraack i>A (U.S. Lines)
•SS SCAN Cargo 24 Moore HcConack !3A (U.S. Lines)
•SS PRIDE Cargo 25 Moore McCoraack SA (U.S. Lines)
SS CRACKER STATE MARINER Cargo 31 Farrell Lines
SS OHIO Seatrain 41 Connecticut Transport (Ogden)
SS AMBASSADOR Cargo 25 Marine Transport Lines
•SS AGENT Cargo 24 Marine Transport Lines
•SS MARGARET LYKES Cargo 22 Unassigned to any agent
SS ADVENTURER Cargo 25 Marine Transport Lines
SS AIDE Cargo 24 Marine Transport Lines
*SS CAPE ANN Cargo 23 Aierican Foreign Shipping
•SS CAPE ALEXANDER Cargo 23 Aierican Foreign Shipping
"SS CAPE ARCHWAY Cargo 22 Aaerican Foreign Shipping
•SS CAPE ALAVA Cargo 23 American Foreign Shipping
•SS CAPE AVINOF Cargo 22 Aierican Foreign Shipping
SS GREAT REPUBLIC Cargo 16 Unassigned to any agent
SS COURIER Cargo 23 Farrell Lines
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TABLE 4-—Continued
SHIP LOCATION: James River, Virq inia
SHIP NAME SHIP TYPE AGE
(Years)
GENERAL A6ENT
SS BANNER Cargo 24 Farrell Lines
•SS KEYSTONE STATE Crane 19 Interocean Management Corporation
•SS ALLISON LYKES Cargo 21 Unassigned to any agent
•SS AIMEE LYKES Cargo 22 Unassigned to any agent
SS SANTA LUCIA Cargo 19 Unassigned to any agent
SS SANTA BARBARA Cargo 18 Unassigned to any agent
SS SANTA ISABEL Cargo 18 Unassigned to any agent
SS SANTA CLARA Cargo 19 Unassigned to any agent
SS SANTA CRUZ Cargo 19 Unassigned to any agent
SS SANTA ELENA Cargo 18 Unassigned to any agent
•SS CHRISTOPHER LYKES Cargo 22 Unassigned to any agent
•Ex-USNS SOUTHERN CROSS Cargo 23 Interocean Management Corporation
Ex-USNS POTOMAC Tanker 21 Uatters Marine i
SHIP LOCATION: Beaumont, Texas
SS AMERICAN EXPLORER Tanker 26 Unassigned to any agent
SS MAINE Seatrain 41 Connecticut Transport (Qgden)
SS WASHINGTON Seatrain 41 Connecticut Transport (Ogden)
SS SANTA ANA Cargo 22 Lykes Bros. Steamship Company
SS PIONEER COMMANDER Cargo 22 U.S. Lines
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TABLE t*—Continued
SHIP LOCATION: Beaumont, Texas
SHIP NAME SHIP TYPE AGE
(Years)
GENERAL AGENT
SS PIONEER CRUSADER Cargo 22 U.S. Lines
SS PIONEER CONTRACTOR Cargo 22 U.S. Lines
SS CHANCELLORSVILLE Tanker W Keystone Shipping Coapany
•SS DEL VIENTO Cargo 1? Unassigned to any agent
»SS GULF SHIPPER Cargo 21 Unassigned to any agent
SS DEL MONTE Cargo 17 Unassigned to any agent
SS DEL VALLE Cargo 17 Unassigned to any agent
•SS GULF TRADER Cargo 21 Unassigned to any agent
SS GULF MERCHANT Cargo 20 Unassigned to any agent
SS GULF BANKER Cargo 21 Unassigned to any agent
SS GULF FARMER Cargo 21 Unassigned to any agent
SS SHELDON LYKES Cargo 22 Unassigned to any agent
SS CHARLOTTE LYKES Cargo 22 Unassigned to any agent
SS ADABELLE LYKES Cargo 22 Unassigned to any agent
SS MAYO LYKES Cargo 22 Unassigned to any agent
SHIP LOCATION: Suisun Bay, Cal]iforni
a
•SS CALIFORNIA Cargo 23 Aierican President Lines
SS PRESIDENT Cargo 24 American President Lines
•Ex-USNS NORTHERN LIGHT Cargo 24 Aierican President Lines
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TABLE 4—Continued


















Unassigned to any agent
American President Lines
Unassigned to any agent
Unassigned to any agent
Unassigned to any agent
Ex-USNS NODAWAY Tanker W Crowley Towing I Transportation Coapany





28 Crowley Towing I Transportation Coapany
28 Crowley Towing I Transportation Coipany
Source: U.S. Maritue Administration, READY RESERVE FORCE (RRF) listing, May 13, 1985.
•Denotes five-day readiness status.
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RRF at a rapid pace within the last two years. This explains
the large numbers of ships in the table that have no general
agents yet assigned.
Each RRF ship is subject to "no notice" activation tests
to determine its readiness capability. During the activation
the RRF ship must be broken out of its layup site, activated
by a repair facility, and either tested at sea or made
available for Navy operational employment. From October to
November 1983, the SS CALIFORNIA carried military cargo for
Exercise BOLD EAGLE 84; the SS PIONEER CRUSADER supported MSC
cargo operations in February and March 1984; the SS
WASHINGTON lifted military cargo in June 1984; and in
September 1984 the SS KEYSTONE STATE, SS EXPORT LEADER, and
the SS CAPE ANN were activated to participate in the Joint
Logistics Over the Shore ( JLOTS ) II exercise at Fort Story,
Virginia CRef. 7:p. 373. All ships were successfully
activated within required time windows and provided useful
support to meet military needs. The Navy plans to activate
each RRF ship at least once every five years for upgrading to
ABS class and Coast Guard certification standards, operation,
and subsequent deactivation and layup CRef. 18:p. 1-13.
E. READY RESERVE FORCE MANNING
The RRF ships a.re manned by merchant seamen when
activated. These men are drawn from the same workforce that
is available to the commercial sector. Tables 5 and 6
provide the manning requirements for the RRF ships in the
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TABLE 5
NUMBER OF LICENSED SEAMEN REQUIRED TO FULLY MAN
EACH DEPARTMENT OF READY RESERVE FORCE SHIPS
( 1984-1995)
Number of Licensed Seamen
Number Deck Eng ineer ing Rad io
Year of Ships Officer Officer Officer
1984 55 274 336 54
1985 73 364 456 77
1986 87 435 539 92
1987 93 464 571 97
1988 101 504 620 1 1 1
1989 108 539 663 113
1990 112 559 688 117
1991 116 578 712 121
1992 116 578 712 121
1993 1 16 578 712 121
1994 116 578 712 121
1995 1 16 578 712 121
Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime
Administration, Office of Maritime Labor and




NUMBER OF UNLICENSED SEAMEN REQUIRED TO FULLY MAN
EACH DEPARTMENT OF READY RESERVE FORCE SHIPS
(198^-1995)
Number of Unlicensed Seamen
Nuiber Deck Engiineeri ng Stewards
of
Year Ships Skilled Unskilled Skilled Unsk illed Skilled Unsk illed
1984 55 394 197 288 193 155 309
1985 73 531 264 385 257 240 480
1986 87 632 315 445 297 277 553
1987 93 667 333 465 310 289 578
1988 101 725 362 505 337 314 628
1989 108 775 387 540 360 336 671
1990 112 804 401 560 374 348 696
1991 116 832 415 580 387 361 712
1992 116 832 415 580 387 361 721
1993 116 832 415 5B0 387 361 721
1994 116 832 415 580 387 361 721
1995 116 832 415 580 387 361 721
Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration, Office of Maritime Labor and
Training, "Reserve Fleet Crewing Feasibility 1984-1995", p. 21.
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event of total activation. The necessary crew size averages
approximately ^1 people per ship. As the tables show, the
number of people required to man the ships grows each year.
In 1985, more than 3,000 seamen were required to man the RRF
ships. By 1991, the RRF will require 1,411 officers and
3,287 unlicensed seamen to man ships that ^rs only used in
case of emergency. This requires that 16 percent of the
predicted available workforce in 1991 be diverted from
commercial pursuits. This requirement will be laid upon a
workforce that is rapidly nearing retirement and has limited
the number of new entrants.
During RRF activation, commercial shipping will continue
to function and the commercial ship operators will be
competing with the RRF ships for available manpower
resources. Using a 2:1 ratio of seamen to billets for labor
supply and assuming that the average four percent decline in
the number of commercial seagoing billets available
continues, by 1991, there will be a requirement for 27,638
seamen to fill the 13,819 commercial billets that will be
available. If the total number of seamen in the industry is
the 31,000 predicted, there will be adequate manpower in the
industry. Full activation of the RRF at this time will add
5,000 billets to the number of jobs available, and require,
at least 5,000 men to fill the billets. This leads to a
shortfall of at least 1,638 sailors. Assuming it takes 40
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people to man one RRF ship, under a 2:1 billet fill ratio,
this shortfall is the equivalent of about 41 RRF ships.
The seaman to billet ratio will actually decline from 2:1
to 1.6:1. This means that, in sheer numbers of people
available, the billets on both commercial and RRF ships could
be filled. Unfortunately, since there will only be just
enough people available, there is no possibility of personnel
rotation and all will be required to be at sea constantly.
In October 1985, the Navy and MARAD sponsored a
Command Post Exercise (CPX) in an attempt to determine
whether the needs of the RRF and commercial needs could
actually be met during full activation. As a part of the
exercise, the availability of qualified personnel to man the
ships was also tested.
This CPX, entitled BREAKOUT-85, was conducted by a
defense contractor, Information Spectrum Incorporated.
BREAKOUT-85 attempted to simulate a full activation of the
RRF. The final report for this exercise is due out in
February 1986. However, preliminary results of the manpower
portion of the exercise were obtained from MARAD ' s Maritime
Labor and Training Office.
Two days of the Breakout-85 exercise were devoted to an
accelerated manning scenario for the ships. General agents
and the unions were invited to send representatives to MARAD
to participate in the two-day exercise. Separate tables were
set up for the general agents and the union representatives
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at the command post location in Washington, D.C. The general
agents were given ship activation requirements by the
exercise coordinator. The agents, in turn, originated actual
orders for crewing which were sent to the respective union
representatives. The union people then performed a
functional match-up between the billet requirements and their
manpower availability. For the purposes of this exercise,
the unions were not required to provide the names of members
assigned to the ships; they only had to verify the existence
of an available body to meet the requirement. Twenty percent
of the union responses provided actual names of the personnel
who were assigned to fill respective b i 1 lets . CRef . 223
The two-day exercise assigned approximately 3000 men to
the 69 RRF ships activated in the simulation. All ships were
fully manned within the time required. Because of the
transportation expense involved, the actual logistics of
moving men to billets was not tested. The results
of the exercise show that in 1985 adequate manning is
available in the event of a full RRF ac t i vat ion . CRef . 22] It
also demonstrated that the unions possess the labor pool
information that would answer many questions concerning




The RRF was created in 1976 in response to the perceived
inability of the NDRF to meet emergency shipping needs. The
64
RRF, a joint venture between MARAD and the Navy, began with
only 30 ships which were drawn from the NDRF inventory. It
has grown to 69 snips in 1985 and is expected to contain 116
ships by fiscal year 1991.
The Navy funds the procurement of new ships for the RRF.
MARAD controls the ships when they are not in use and
provides them to the Navy, ready to deploy within a five-,
ten-, or twenty-day time frame when required. MARAD
maintains and prepares the RRF ships for duty through the use
of GAAs with commercial shipping firms.
The size of the RRF has grown as the size of the U.S.
flag fleet has declined. In this way the military ensures
the availability of ships to meet emergency shipping
requirements. RRF ships are manned only during emergencies,
as a result, there is the constant risk that ships will be
available to meet military needs but they will not be able to
perform their functions because of a lack of crews.
As the U.S. flag fleet declines, so too do the number of
jobs available for mariners. Disappearing jobs mean
disappearing numbers of mariners available to man ships at
any time. In 1985, BREAKOUT-85 demonstrated that there are
enough seafarers available to man the commercial ships and
all of the present 69 RRF ships. But one must still ask:
what will happen in 1987 when the number of RRF ships grows
to 83—or in 1991, just six years from now, when 5,000 people
will be required for the 116 RRF ships as well as the
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commercial fleet. Uill there be enough people available?
The answer to that question might possibly be found in the
pages of the union membership books.
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V. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES
There are several alternatives that may help resolve the
maritime manpower shortages likely to occur during a full
activation of the RRF . These alternatives are discussed
below.
A. CIVILIAN MANNING OF AE , AFS , AND AD TYPE SUPPORT SHIPS
Contract manning of Navy ships provides jobs for
seafarers. Preserving jobs in the industry helps to keep a
stable workforce. A 2:1 billet ratio can be maintained and a
pool of seafarers remains available to man RRF ships in an
emergency
.
The Navy, through MSC , has already increased the number
of contract crews that man many of its support ships. A
further step the Navy might take in order to insure jobs for
merchant seamen is to man its ships, which are presently
manned by uniformed seamen, with merchant seamen. The
classes of ships that could be considered for this contract
manning include ammunition ships ( AE ) , combat stores ships
(AFS), and destroyer tenders (AD).
Contract manning of these ships would provide a new base
of jobs for merchant seamen that could begin as early as
1986. These are jobs that will continue to exist for as long
as the Navy needs to be resupplied at sea. The cost of
manning the ships with merchant seamen would be lower than
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manning them with Navy military personnel CRef. 25:p. 413.
Considerably fewer merchant seamen would be used to man the
ships than the large number of military personnel presently
on board. Because of the 2:1 billet ratio for merchant
mariners, the ships could be better utilized during
peacetime, since they would need to spend less time in the
ship's homeport. Contract manning also releases uniformed
sailors to man the new ships of the 600-ship Navy without
Congressional action to increase the Navy's manpower
al lowances
.
Costs to the military for this alternative include a loss
of survivability for the vessel during wartime. Smaller
crews mean fewer people for damage control and no people to
replace casualties. Loss of the billets on these ships would
also decrease the number of training and command billets
available to Navy personnel. Furthermore, there would be an
eventual loss of fleet support skills for uniformed
personnel. The military would also lose operational control
of the ships to the contractors, and would only have limited
control over the selection of crews.
One other manning problem that could occur during wartime
is an "artificial manpower shortage." There ^re no laws that
force merchant seamen to go to sea if they choose not to go.
Life onshore could appear a lot safer and just as lucrative
to merchant seamen during wartime. Both Britain and the
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United States have had to deal with this problem during
wart ime
.
B. BETTER UNION CONTROL OF MANPOWER ASSETS
As described in Chapter III, since 1934-, unions have
handled their manning process on a local level. Ships might
sail shorthanded or not at all because people were not
available in the local area to go to sea. Most of the unions
that will provide seafarers for the RRF ships have a national
membership. All but one of these unions still assign their
men on a local rather than national level. Failure to
institute a method of national manpower control wastes union
and ship operators' resources. It will also probably lead to
delayed RRF sailings in the event of a full RRF activation.
The SIU has found a means of better controlling its
manpower resources through centralization of its assignment
process. Although it adds an extra step to work that could
be done on the local level, it has the added dimension of
knowing where members Are available for employment when local
sources are depleted.
The costs for the development of this capability include
costs for computer hardware, the development of the manpower
data base, and the software development costs. The software
has already been developed by the SIU, and cooperative
efforts on the part of all the unions could lead to a sharing




Hardware costs will vary, depending upon the equipment
acquired. The IBM 4341 used by the SIU retails for between
$81,000 and $400,000. However, this equipment consists of a
mainframe computer with a considerable amount of core memory
and has many other uses. An IBM PC AT with 60 megabites of
memory on hard disk could conceivably perform the necessary
manpower control functions for between $12,000 to $15,000.
The costs for developing these assets could be shared by
the unions and the ship operators as both will benefit from
improved manpower management. Delayed sailings because of
manpower shortages are very expensive for today's ship
operators, and union manpower availability shortages hurt the
union's credibility with the operators.
C. UNION MANPOWER POOLING
Historically, the maritime unions have jealously guarded
the jobs that they control. If a shipping company was under
contract to a particular union and the union could not
provide the appropriate number of people for a voyage, the
sailing was delayed or undertaken shorthanded. If the ship
operator approached another source for the needed personnel,
his contracted union could be expected to strike and all
operations would stop.
Since the RRF ships are manned by these same unions
through commercial shipping companies, they are subject to
these same problems. One solution to the problems associated
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with local union manpower shortages is the pooling of union
resources during emergencies.
There are some 31 different seagoing unions operating in
the U.S. CRef. 4:p. 185]. Many overlap in the skills their
members possess. Local pooling agreements could be drawn up
between unions with similar skills to provide the necessary
manpower for RRF ships during their activation.
These agreements would apply only to RRF ships and their
activation period. The agreements would not infringe upon
any union's control of jobs, as the agreement would be used
only when personnel were not available for RRF ships.
The unions would be forced to trust one another to abide
by the terms of the agreements and work together to settle
the member crossover differences in pay, benefits, and work
requirements
.
A benefit for the manning of the RRF will be fewer, if
any, delayed or shorthanded sailings, and the estimated
$7,089,400 cost for delayed sailings that occurred during
Vietnam might not be repeated.
D. INCREASE THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE MERCHANT MARINE RESERVE
The MMR presently consists only of officers who are
actively pursuing seagoing employment. Unfortunately, few of
those graduating from the maritime academies are able to find
seagoing employment. Their Coast Guard licenses are allowed
to lapse and an entire group of possible crew members for RRF
ships are forgotten. In 1985, there were 5,434 licensed
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merchant mariners available but not sailing. By 1991, this
number is predicted to decline to 1,668, but those people
could be used to offset some of the 1,638 sailor shortage
that may occur with RRF activation. CRef. ll:p. 17]
A way to prevent this loss of skills would be to make
these non-sailing merchant officers a part of the MMR
.
Through Navy correspondence courses they would receive about
the same Navy-oriented training that present MMR officers are
receiving. Instead of two weeks active duty per year, they
could be required to perform three weeks and receive
refresher training and shipboard time at the various maritime
academies under the cognizance of the Naval Science
Departments at each academy. Upon the successful completion
of the special MMR active duty training, the Coast Guard
might issue a special waiver to extend the licenses of these
officers. These extensions would make the licenses valid in
the event the MMR officers were required aboard RRF ships in
an emergency.
Recruitment costs for this would not increase over
present MMR recruiting costs, since it could be done through
existing MMR recruitment channels. Training facilities exist
in the form of the maritime academies and the time is
available during the schools' summer break periods. The Naval
Science Departments are in place at all academies.
The RRF gains a pool of trained officers that will be
available for use in the event of manpower shortages during
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activation. Sailings will not be delayed because of manpower
shortages and the troops requiring the RRF cargos will
receive them when needed.
E. DRAFT DEFERMENT
During the Vietnam Conflict, the Selective Service System
allowed draft deferments for those skills that were in short
supply in the merchant marine. While this action did not
induce a large number of people to join the maritime
workforce, it did provide some relief for the merchant marine
CRef. 15:p. 293.
In six years, the entry level, unlicensed, seagoing
workforce will have to increase significantly to replace the
present workforce as it retires. Most entry-level personnel
are between the ages of 18 and 25. If a draft were enacted,
these are the people who would be drafted first.
The RRF will require at least 1,51^ unskilled,
unlicensed—entry level
—
personnel just to man the ships as
they are activated to perform their surge shipping mission.
Drafting these people could contribute to a critical manpower
shortage for the RRF ships. On the other hand, leaving these
people in the industry will ensure fewer delayed or
shorthanded RRF sailings.
F. NATIONAL SERVICE
Periodically, proposals are offered to create a system of
national service for young Americans. One form of national
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service to consider is service in the merchant marine.
Required training and service in the merchant marine would
provide a skilled pool of available labor for RRF ships,
should the need arise.
The costs of this program that would be carried by the
government would be relatively low—mostly registration and
processing costs. The cost to the maritime industry would be
very high. Unlicensed training could be provided by the
union schools that are already in existence. However, these
schools would need to be greatly expanded to deal with the
number of people who would need to be processed through them.
A flood of labor into a market that is already experiencing
job shortages will make unemployment in the market even worse
than it already is.
G. MILITARIZE THE MERCHANT MARINE
One aspect of manpower shortages in the maritime industry
is that of artificial shortages created by the workforce
itself. The choice of whether or not to accept employment
aboard a ship lies with the merchant mariner. The decision
not to go to sea created serious manpower shortages for the
British during World War II. The British government reacted
with a measure that militarized the merchant marine and
forced seamen to go back to sea. This measure helped
alleviate much of the British manpower shortage problem for
the remainder of the war.
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The question was raised during the Vietnam Conflict as to
how much of the manpower shortages for GAA vessels was due to
seamen choosing not to go to sea CRef. 15:p. 29]. When RRF
ships are activated) there is the possibility of an
artificial manpower shortage because of the reluctance on the
part of industry workers to support the mission of the RRF
ships. One way to avoid this type of shortage and insure
that every available mariner is utilized if he or she is
needed is to militarize the merchant marine in times of
emergency
.
The social costs of this alternative are great. This act
removes the right of free choice from one segment of the
population simply because of its profession. The risks to
merchant mariners in a wartime scenario are often greater
than those faced by soldiers in battle because merchant ships
and RRF ships are not armed. Forcing people in civilian
status into the position of an unarmed soldier is the main
effect of this measure.
The idea of militarizing the merchant marine was
investigated by Congress during the manpower shortages of
World War II. The bill was never passed because payment of
war bonuses and higher wages for merchant mariners helped to
alleviate the seriousness of the problem. The maritime
manpower shortages that occurred during Korea and Vietnam did
not raise the question of militarization of the merchant
marine to solve the problem. More importantly, since there
75
is no historical precedent in this country and there are
Constitutional questions surrounding the action, this
alternative would probably be treated as a matter of very
last resort.
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VI . CONCLUSIONS AND RECQMMLNDAT IONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The employment situation for the U.S. seafarer is much
like a roller coaster. Demand for maritime labor reaches its
peak during wartime and begins a long decline that lasts
until the next emergency. Each emergency pulls great numbers
of people into the industry. These people are trained, and
then their skills are wasted as the U.S. maritime industry
returns to its normal low operating level. While the
industry is in a labor oversupply situation, there are few
new entrants to the field and thus the labor force becomes
stagnant and declines. Members tend to reach retirement at
about the same time and a younger workforce replaces the
retiring one during the times of manpower shortages,
beginning the roller coaster again. New personnel are
entering the industry, but at a very slow rate because of the
lack of available jobs.
At the beginning of World War II when there were 60,000
merchant seamen in the labor force, manpower shortages caused
shipping delays. During Korea and Vietnam manpower shortages
also caused shipping delays. In 198^+, there were 3^,000
seagoing mariners in the maritime workforce. In 1991, it is
predicted that there will be 31,000 seafarers in the
workforce. Assuming a S:l billet ratio, there will be at
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least 4-1 RRF ships that will not be manned should they be
activated at that time. Using the 1.6:1 ratio that will
exist if the RRF is activated in 1991, there will be enough
manpower available to man commercial and RRF ships; however,
people will be required to be at sea constantly.
To offset the anticipated shortage of ships to carry
military cargo during emergencies, the Department of Defense
is building a RRF consisting of 116 ships. These ships are
preserved with no crews until they are needed. They provide
a stable sealift resource for the military. Unfortunately,
these ships must have crews. Each RRF ship requires about **0
people to operate it. By 1991, 16 percent of the available
workforce will be needed to man RRF ships.
In 1985, a simulated exercise successfully matched 3,000
people to RRF billets. The only problem with this matching
was that it was all done on paper. Because of the enormous
expense involved, people and billets were never joined in an
operational setting. There is no way of knowing if the 3,000
people assigned during the exercise would have arrived to man
the ships. Although the merchant marine has an impressive
history of "rising to meet the needs of the Fourth Arm of
Defense," most of the workforce that is available has been
around since World War II and is still aging.
D0D and MARAD have instituted programs and studies to
determine how many people will be needed to man the RRF and
how to preserve people in the industry workforce. To date,
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the effects of these moves on the industry cannot be
completely evaluated because not enough time has passed since
their inception. It is clear, however, that action must be
taken to determine what workforce will be available to man
the RRF ships.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
Several actions may be taken to insure adequate manning
of the RRF ships. The findings of this thesis support the
fo 1 lowing
:
* The unions should be encouraged to develop manpower
pooling agreements that would come into effect when the RRF
ships are fully activated. This is the least expensive of
all alternatives and will more effectively employ local
workers and possibly prevent delayed or shorthanded
sailings of RRF ships.
* The unions should be encouraged to develop and maintain
manpower data bases to provide more effective utilization
of manpower resources. This will provide certain knowledge
about who is available and where they are available,
nationwide, to crew RRF ships.
* The Navy should expand the MMR program to include those
maritime academy graduates who do not find seagoing
employment. This is a trained segment of the maritime
industry that is being wasted and overlooked as a possible
RRF manpower asset. These people can be used as a backup
resource for RRF crews should anticipated manpower
shortages occur.
* As the 600-ship Navy becomes more of a reality, the Navy
might consider contract manning for their support ships.
The loss of command and control of these vessels may have
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to be considered a fair tradeoff for the uniformed manpower
required to man the new Navy ships.
C. SUMMARY
There is no guarantee that any of these recommendations
will prevent delayed or shorthanded sailings of RRF ships.
However, they will provide a more accurate accounting of the
manpower resources available, should the RRF be activated.
These recommendations will also increase the number of
standby resources that are available to the RRF if the need
arises. Attempts by DQD to provide industry jobs will only
help if the maritime industry begins to stabilize. U.S.
maritime history raises some doubt that this will ever occur.
In light of the unavailability of the data that tells
what resources are available and the disappointing responses
from the unions, who have the most accurate data, it is
recommended that the Navy give consideration to a more
detailed effort to document and evaluate the true size and
demographics of the maritime labor pool. A sure knowledge of
what resources are available and where those resources can




LETTERS SENT TO GENERAL AGENTS AND REPLIES
LIST OF GENERAL AGENTS CONTACTED
American Foreign Steamship
^American President Lines, Inc.
Apex Marine Corporation




Lykes Brothers Steamship Company, Inc.
Marine Transport Lines, Inc.
*Ogden Marine Incorporated
United States Lines, Inc.
Responded as of December 1985
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I am a student at the Naval Post Graduate School in
Monterey, California. As one of the requirements for my
degree, I am writing a thesis on the availability of the U.S.
merchant marine to man the ships of the Ready Reserve Force
( RRF ) should they be activated. I am hoping that you will
provide me with information about the General Agency
Agreement ( GAA ) ship(s) for which you are the agent.
What I am primarily interested in is whether you have
any special provisions for manning the GAA ship(s) should
they be required for an emergency? If so, would you please
describe them? If not, do you foresee any problems with
manning these extra ships?
I am also interested in any experiences you may have had
manning ships during the Viet Nam Conflict. This is whether
you had any GAA ships or not. Did you have problems
obtaining skilled crews?
I do appreciate any help you can give me concerning
these questions. If you have any questions, please call me.
My home telephone number is ( 408 ) 384-1679. I can also be
reached through the Administrative Sciences Curricular Office






KICAN PRESIDENT LINES, LTD.
October 21, 1985
Lt. Mary T. Winger, USN
129 Cypress Grove Court
Marine, CA 93933
Lt. Winger:
I am writing in response to your letter of October 9, 1935.
We are presently general agents for five ships of the Ready Reserve Fleet.
We have a pre-determined manning schedule that shows number, rating, wage
rate, etc., including particulars necessary for determining pay rates, i.e.,
Gross Tonnage + Shaft Horsepower = Power Tonnage. Also shown is the class of
ship, i.e., the PRESIDENT is Class A-l Regular. The A-l tells us she is
25001 to 35000 Power Tonnage; Regular tells us she is a regular operated ship
as opposed to a fast turn ship.
Manning of our ships is done by contract as follows:
Masters, Mates & Pilots (MM&P) - Masters & Mates
American Radio Association (ARA) - Radio Operators
Sailors' Union of the Pacific (SUP) - Unlicensed Deck Personnel
Marine Staff Officers Assn. (MS0) - Pursers
Marine Engineers Beneficial Assn. (MEBA) - Licensed Engineers
Marine Firemen's Union (MFU) - Unlicensed Engine Dept. Personnel
Seafarers' International Union (AGLIW) - Stewards' Dept.
On occasion we have activated the GAA ships as directed by the Government, and
this has included making voyages for cargo delivery, fleet exercises, etc.
Thus far, we have had no problems with manning these ships as required. There
could be a delay in manning if all ships were activated at one time. However,
we do believe that such delay would be of short duration and would not affect
all ships.
We manned a number of ships during the Viet Nam conflict, and were operated as
directed by the Government. I don't recall any delays because of crew shortages
Delays were mostly the result of needed repairs or maintenance.
INTERQCEAN MANAGEMENT CORPORATION
THREE PARKWAY • PHI LA., PA. 19102 • (215)569-4550
TWX: 710-670-0553 • TELEX: 831 460
30 October 1985
Lt. Mary T. Winger, USN
129 Cypress Grove Court
Marina, CA 93933
Dear Lt . Winger:
Interocean Management Corporation at present has three ships
for which we are General Agents for the Maritime Administration, these
being the SS KEYSTONE STATE and the SS GEM STATE, the first two
auxiliary crane ships, and the USNS SOUTHERN CROSS which is a Military
Logistics Support Force ship. All three of these vessels have unique
identifiable missions where special training of seamen is essential.
As such, the corporation has identified the need, and has worked
closely with the officer and crew unions with which we have contracts
insure that qualified and trained personnel are available on demand.
Training programs have also been established to provide additional
training to those personnel who would be assigned without appropriate
backgrounds. In the course of two activations, these procedures have
worked well, and the vessels have been able to sail on time and carry
out their assigned missions. At this point in time, we do not foresee
a problem in manning these particular vessels.
The Maritime Administration and the Department of the Navy,
specifically OPNAV 42, are presently running a command post exercise
called Breakout 85 which covers the activation of all the vessels
presently in the Ready Reserve Force. The exercise started on the
21st of October and will end on 1 November. This exercise covers all
aspects, on paper of course, of the activation of the RRF, including a
compressed manning scenario carried out on the 22nd and 23rd at MARAD
headquarters involving unions and the personnel staffs of the various
General Agents. You may wish to contact Mr. Walter Lockland, of MARAD
who is the Deputy Exercise Director. I'm sure he would be most willing
to send you a copy of the CPX plan and also a copy of the final report
which will be put together based on comments and constructive input
from the various players. Your timing in requesting your information
is quite good, as I'm sure much discussion will be generated when the
results of this particular CPX becomes known.
8U
INTEROCEAN MANAGEMENT CORPORATION
Lt. Mary T. Winger, USN
30 October 1985
Page Two
During the Vietnam conflict, this company had no General Agency
agreements with MARAD, however we did have several of our own ships
trading in the vicinity of Vietnam and working with the Military Sealift
Command. During that time frame, I cannot remember any problems
obtaining skilled crews for those ships.
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October 24, 1985
Ms. Mary T. Winger
219 Cypress Grove Court
Marina, CA 93933
Dear Ms. Winger:
In response to your letter of October 9, 1985:
At this time certain of our personnel are actively engaged in the
simulated manning of two vessels in the Ready Reserve Force. The opera-
tion is to take place in Washington from October 22, 1985 through
October 25, 1985.
Basically the exercise consists of arranging for the breakout of the
vessel from the Ready Reserve Force at Beaumont, Texas. We will simulate
arrangements for tugs and pilots to tow the vessel from the Reserve Fleet
to a specified shipyard for necessary repairs, etc., so that the vessel
will be ready for sea-duty in approximately three and one half days.
During the shipyard period, we will simulate supplying bunkers, pro-
visions and crew. The action taken will involve simulated contacts to
suppliers of bunkers, stores, etc. and telephone calls to Deck Officers
and to the Unions with whom we have Agreements. By way of explanation we
have our own Agreement with our Deck Officers. We have Working Agreements
with the Unions who supply our Engineers, Radio Officers and Unlicensed
seamen and which call for those Officers and crew to be engaged through the
hiring offices of their respective unions. We do have the right to select
Chief Engineers and Chief Stewards provided they are union members. We have
Working Agreements with the Marine Engineers Beneficial Association, the
American Radio Association and the National Maritime Union of America.
Referring to your question about the Viet Nam conflict; we did operate
GAA Dry Cargo vessels as well as United States Navy civilian-manned tankers
along with our own fleet. We had no problems in manning those vessels.
We appreciate your interest and hope we have been helpful. If we can
be of further assistance please do not hesitate to contact us.
Very truly yours
,
KEYSTONE SHIPPING CO. , Agent
il Chll CORP. 280 PARK AVENUE, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017 (212) 949-4500
October 18, 1985
Lt. Mary T. Winger
129 Cypress Grove Court
Marina, CA. 93933
Dear Lt. Winger:
We note your interest in the manning and activation of the
Ready Reserve Fleet. You are fortunate that at the present
moment, the Department of Transportation is conducting an
exercise on this very subject. You should contact:
Mr. W. Lockland
U. S. Dept. of Transportation
Maritime Administration




1745 S. Jefferson Davis Hwy
.
Arlington, Va . 22202
Att: Mr. John S. Storm










LETTERS SENT TO UNIONS AND REPLIES
LIST OF UNIONS CONTACTED
American Radio Association ( ARA
)
Associated Maritime Officers ( AMO
)
Marine Cooks and Stewards Union ( MCS
)
Marine Engineers Beneficial Association District 1 (MEBA 1)
Marine Engineers Beneficial Association District 2 (MEBA 2)
Marine Firemen's Union ( MFU
)
Marine Staff Officers ( MSO
)
Masters, Mates, and Pilots of America (MMP)
National Maritime Union of America ( NMU
)
Radio Officers Union of the United Telegraph
Workers Union ( ROU
)
Sailors' Union of the Pacific (SUP)
Seafarers Internation Union of North America (SIU)
Staff Officers Association of America (SOA)
Responded as of December 1985.
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City, State , Zip
Dear Mr . ( )
I am a student at the Naval Post Graduate School in
Monterey, California. As one of the requirements for my
degree, I am writing a thesis on the availability of the U.S.
merchant marine to man the ships of the Ready Reserve Force
( RRF ) should they be activated. I am hoping that you will
provide me with information pertinent to your union.
My first question is, does your union have any special
provisions for its manning of the General Agency Agreement
( GAA ) ships? These ships are managed by U.S. shipping agents
with whom you have contracts. If so, would you please
describe them.
My second question deals with your experiences during
the Viet Nam war. Did you make any special efforts to ensure
GAA ships had the required crews? If so, what were they and
were there any problems that resulted from them? Did you
have any problems providing manpower for all ships that
required it?
Thirdly, I am interested in your union's outlook for
the future. How many members do you currently have? What
percentage of your members leave the union every year, and
why? How many new people are you admitting to your union
every year? Are members who leave easily replaced? Do you
maintain data on past members who leave for reasons other
than death or retirement? What is the average age of your
members? Are women entering the field in any numbers? What
training is available to your members to maintain and upgrade
their skills? Do you have information concerning which of
your members are also members of the Naval Reserve Forces?
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If so, what percentage of your members are in the U.S. Naval
Reserve?
I do appreciate any help you can give me concerning
these questions. If you have any questions? please call me.
My home telephone number is (408) 384-1679. I can also be
reached through the Administrative Sciences Curricular Office











AFFILIATED WITH THE SEAFARERS INTERNATIONAL UNION OF N. A.
AFL-CIO PORTS SEF
240 Second SfreeT Portland, Oreg
San Francisco, California 94105 Ne.-. N




Lt. Mary T. Winger, USN
129 Cypress Grove Court
Marina, CA 9393 3
Dear Lt. Winger:
This is to acknowledge your letter of October 9, 1985
requesting information to assist you in writing a thesis on the
ability of this Union to provide the necessary ratings to man the
ships of the Ready Reserve Force should they be activated.
We recently received advance notice from the Maritime
Administration of a simulated Ready Reserve Force mobilization
exercise scheduled for October 22-24, 1985, at the Maritime
Administration's Operations Center in Washington, D. C. The key
objective of this exercise is to assess the availability of
seafarers and the procedures to crew the 65 ships in today's
Ready Reserve Force.
Our Union will have a representative in Washington to
participate in this exercise. For a full report on the results
of this exercise, we suggest you contact Mr. Arthur W. Friedberg,
Director, Office of Maritime Labor & Training, Maritime
Administration, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D. C.
20590.
In an attempt to answer your questions, I will start out
by stating that the Union does not have any special provisions to
the manning of the General Agency Agreement (GAA) ships. At the
present time, APL is the only steamship company under contract to
this Union that is an operating agent for five vessels presently
in Suisun Bay. We would not anticipate any problem providing the
crews for these ships.
Our membership is presently declining, as it usually does in
peace time. The Marine Firemen's Union, which represents
unlicensed engine room personnel, has 520 active members—a 2 to
1 ratio of members to jobs. The present jobs are rotated after
four months of employment aboard vessels.
Our experience in past conflicts, including the Viet Nam
War, shows we had very few problems providing crews for the GAA
ships when activated. It appears there is an abundance of people
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October 15, 1985
with seamen's documents who show up when jobs are available. To
a large degree, they come from other unlicensed unions.
After a period of employment, our training programs are
available to upgrade their skills and endorsements. These
training programs are jointly sponsored by the Pacific Maritime
Association who represents the shipowners under contract.
Automation, new technology, larger ships, smaller crews,
and bankruptcies due to the inability of companies to compete in
the Pacific trades have all contributed to a tremendous decline
in job opportunities. For these reasons, very few women have
succeeded in gaining employment in the unlicensed engine
department with companies under contract.
As to the Union's outlook for the future, we are optimistic.
However, we feel the numbers will eventually dictate a merger of
all unlicensed unions.
The average age of our members (approximately 56 years of
age) shows quite an older membership. The members who leave
usually go on pension. We do not keep records on members who
leave for reasons other than retirement or death. To my
knowledge, there are no members of the Naval Reserve Forces
shipping as unlicensed engine room crew members.
I hope the above information is helpful to you in writing
your thesis. Best wishes and good luck in your future endeavors.
Verv <"i*iii" L
Marine Firemen's Union
AFF MATED WITH THE SEAFARERS INTERNATIONAL UNION CF N. A.
BRANCHES AFL-CIO
Sea--e Washington 240 Second Street
Ian Padre la rorr : San Francisco, California 94105
He-: Howafi (415) 362-45 = 2
Dispatcher: (415) 362-7593
October 16, 1985
Lt. Mary T. Winger , USN
12 9 Cypress Grove Court
Marina, CA 93933
Dear Lt. Winger:
In response to your letter of October 9 and as a follow up
to my letter of October 15, 1985, I attended a briefing today
conducted by the Maritime Administration representatives in San
Francisco.
I am enclosing a copy of the "Command Post Exercise Plan
Breakout-8 5 for Activation of Ready Reserve Force" that was












7 29 CypxeAA Gnove Count
Mailna, Ca. 93933
Vean. M-6. VJtngen.:
Voun. letten. o& Octoben. 9th neeetved,
i>oKfiy ^on. the delay tn anAweitng you.
1 - We have a contract wtth kmen.tean Pn.2-6tde.nt
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2 - We had to t12.cn.utt people duh.tng the Utet
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power.




the hew xematntng jobi>. Theie
an.e not new people entextng the Iteld a& thetn. an.e
ample expenteneed people avatlable. I have no know-
ledge o & any member who ii> In the Naval Receive.
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I hope I dtdn' t caui>e you any tneonventence. I & you
have any huh.then quettton* , call me at (475) 421 - S603
.
National Maritime Union of America
Affiliated with: The American Federation <>j Lab , . hi ' . .. <
AFL-CIO Maritime Committee
International Transport\ii>rJcer\ F< deration
National Headquarters:
346 West 17th Street. Wew York. \'.Y, fOWl \2i.
Cable Address: ENEMU. V.)
November 7, 1985
Ms. Mary T. Winger
129 Cypress Grove Court
Marina, CA 93933
Dear Ms. Winger:
Your recent letter to Mr. Shannon Wall has been forwarded to
me for response.
1. The NMU does not have any special provisions for manning
GAA ships. We man these vessels in accordance with Government
requirements provided such requirements are deemed adequate
by us. Most of our deep-sea contracted companies have oper-
ating agreements covering GAA ships. This would include
Farrell Lines, Marine Transport Lines, American Foreign Steam-
ship, U.S. Lines, Keystone Shipping, and Lykes Bros. Steamship.
2. During the Vietnam War, GAA ships were manned in the same
manner as commercial vessels, by means of the principal of
rotary shipping through the hiring halls. For the most part,
we did not encounter any problems providing for manpower,
although on rare occasions a vessel might have sailed short-
handed.
3. The NMU's Deep-Sea membership is approximately 10,000.
This figure does not include membership in our other marine
divisions, Government operations or the growing shoreside
sector. Membership replacement is not a problem in the Deep
Sea division. Average Deep-Sea membership age is 52 years old.
A small percentage of this membership is female. The NMU does
operate the NMU Upgrading and Retraining School for the purpose
of developing skilled ratings. We do not have data reflecting
the percentage of members who are in the U.S. Naval Reserves.
I hope you will find the above information useful. Please
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Lt. Mary T. Winger
United States Navy-
Super intendent (Code 36)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943
Dear Lt . Winger:
Thank you for your recent letter regarding the role of the
U.S. merchant marine in crewing the vessels of the Ready Reserve
Fleet (RRF) . I am pleased to note your interest in this crit-
ical matter which is of fundamental importance to not only the
Seafarers International Union but to the overall defensive
capability of our national waterborne military presence.
The Seafarers International Union is fully committed to the
concept and development of the RRF defense initiative. As you
noted in your letter, the SIU has contractual arrangements with
designated general agents responsible for selected vessels of
the RRF. These contracts provide for the crewing of one or more
RRF vessels in instances of both sustained activation as well as
for the purposes of conducting mobilization exercises. The SIU
has devoted considerable efforts to tailor our contracts in
accordance with military objectives. For example, despite the
fact that we have not had a general strike since 1946, all of
our military contracts contain a no-strike provision. Further-
more, the SIU has incorporated innovative contract changes which
have resulted in a 30 percent cost reduction. We have pared
back our wage scales to 1981/1982 levels, significantly reduced
fringe benefit contributions, and have eliminated special
compensation provisions for cargo handling activities. Without
question, the SIU has a vested interest in the successful
implementation of our commercially crewed military service
contracts. The SIU is confident of our ability to satisfy
stated defense requirements, and we take great pride in our
record of service in the field of military support activity.
The U.S. merchant marine has always lived up to its calling
as the Fourth Arm of Defense. During the Vietnam conflict,
civil ian-crewed vessels were always available to provide our
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combat troops with critical logistical support even under the
most challenging circumstances. Our record of performance in
the Vietnam conflict bears impressive testament to the commit-
ment of the U.S. merchant marine to enhancing the defensive
integrity of our nation.
The SIU, despite the current depression in the maritime
industry, remains firmly optimistic about the future of the U.S.
merchant marine. I feel that, from an economic as well as
national defense perspective, there will always be a need for a
strong, skilled U.S. seafaring capability. Our commitment to
the future is abundantly evident in the substantial training
facility we have constructed at the Harry Lundeberg School of
Seamanship in Piney Point, Maryland. The Harry Lundeberg School
of Seamanship possesses a state-of-the-art physical plant which
includes a prototype, fully operational crane; an advanced,
computerized simulator; a comprehensive library; academic
programs for G.E.D. and associate degrees, as well as a fleet of
operating tugs and ships. The SIU has worked in close consulta-
tion with the branches of the armed forces in the development of
a curriculum package specifically designed to satisfy military
objectives. Given the excellent reputation of the school, there
is no shortage of eager applicants. However, due to the SIU
policy of securing a seafaring position for each graduate of the
school, we have been forced to severly restrict the size of our
entering classes. Hopefully, once the industry rebounds from
its current depressed state, we can once again increase the
number of students entering into the school program.
Finally, in reference to your question concerning the size
and composition of the SIU membership, we have approximately
9,000 seafaring members at the moment. Over the past few years,
we have observed an increase in the number of female seafarers,
although our membership is still predominately male. Due to the
fact that, by and large, the SIU represents -he unlicensed crew,
only a small number of our members are in the U.S. Naval Reserve
I hope the foregoing will be of some value to you in the
drafting of your thesis paper. Once again, thank you for your
interest in our activities in support of our nation's defense.
Sincerely,




Staff Officers' Association of America
95 RIVER STREET . 4th FLOOR • HOBOKEN. NEW.JERSEY 07030 • (201)798-0200
D E. STEVENS, President KENNETH E. THOMPSON, Vice-President
GERARD F DURAND, Secretary-Treasurer
December 12, 1985
Mary T. Winger
129 Cypress Grove Court
Marina, Ca. 9 39 33
Dear Ms. Winger,
Thank you for your letter of October 9, 19 85.
I regret to say that the SOA did not get a contract
in June. As of January 31st, we will be out of business


































Military Seal if t Command
National Defense Reserve Fleet
National Maritime Union




Country of registry of a ship
Contract signed by all sailors for a single
voyage of any ship
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